Abstract: |
In voting theory and social choice theory, decision systems can be represented as simple games, i.e., cooperative games viewed as models of voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. Simple games stablish that the benefit that a coalition may have is always binary, i.e., a coalition may be winning or losing, depending on whether the players in the coalition are able to benefit themselves from the game by achieving together some goal. Many voting systems, as many real situations, can be represented as weighted voting games, one of the most relevant subclasses of simple games. We say that a simple game is a weighted voting game if there exists a real number q and we are able to assign a real number to each player in such a way that the sum of the weights of any winning coalition meets or exceeds the quota q, but the sum of the weights of any losing coalition is less than q. Both simple games and weighted voting games are closely related with many other disciplines such logic and threshold logic, circuit complexity, artificial intelligence, geometry, linear programming, Sperner theory, order theory, agent systems, social network analysis, etc. For simple games, there are many known metrics related to specific properties: a) Decisive index, where we count how many winning coalitions are with respect to all possible coalitions; b) dimension, the minimum number of weighted voting games which intersection is the given simple game; c) codimension, the minimum number of weighted voting games which union is the given simple game; d) multidimension, the minimum number of weighted voting games which intersection and union is the given simple game; e) trade robustness, counting how many players can be mixed from a winning coalition to get a losing coalition; f) invariant trade robustness, counting how many players can be mixed from a minimal winning coalition to get a losing coalition; g) alpha-robustness, how far is a simple game to be a weighted voting game based on some inequality systems. In this work, we stablish new metrics based on linear programming that evaluate how far is a simple game to be a weighted voting game: a) from integer (or real) weights depending on the minimum sum of the error of all coalitions; b) from real weights depending on the minimum maximum error for all coalitions; c) from real weights depending on a minimum global error for all coalitions; d) from real weights depending on the number of mixed coalitions. Furthermore, we give some exhaustive experimental results up to 6 players, up to isomorphism. We also analyse some metrics to stablish a classification for a simple game and to compare the behaviour of each same based on those metrics. Acknowledgements: J. Freixas and X. Molinero have been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-104987GB-I00 (JUVOCO) and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM]; M. Albareda has been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2022-139219OB-I00 (MOSCA). |