Abstract: |
In agriculture, several structures are set up as cooperative or economic interest group (EIG). However, these structures have a set of limits such as the access to finance, to national and international markets, etc. In addition, they do not care about gender balance or farmers’ vulnerability (climate, education, disability, age, fitness, assets, communication channels, socio-cultural norms, prejudice, ethnicity, etc.). This work provides a Citizen Support and Solidarity (CSS) mechanism in a context of self-interested farmers (agents) in unstable and uncertain context (interests, availabilities, interdependencies, etc.) where we consider each EIG or each cooperative as a coalition. CSS proposes a core-stable, auto-stabilizing coalition formation mechanism which maximizes social welfare, and converges gradually to near optimal results. CSS combines game theory methods and the laws of probability. Our experiments and their analysis demonstrate the efficiency of CSS. |